Dispositionality and qualitativity are key notions to describe the world that we inhabit. Dispositionality is a matter of what a thing is disposed to do in certain circumstances. Qualitativity is a matter of how a thing is like. According to the Identity Theory of powers, every fundamental property is at once dispositional and qualitative, or a powerful quality. Canonically, the Identity Theory holds a contentious identity claim between a property’s dispositionality and its qualitativity. In the literature, this view faces a (...) contradiction objection that undermines its merits. We should therefore consider an alternative version that does not embrace the identity claim. My aim is to show that we can enjoy the benefits of the Identity Theory without embracing the identity between the dispositional and the qualitative. I shall argue that a distinction between two senses of dispositionality and qualitativity serves the purpose. I will then discuss three readings of the identity claim that can be formulated in light of such a distinction. I will conclude that even if the identity were to fail in any of the suggested readings, it would be possible to hold an account of fundamental powerful qualities. (shrink)

Grounding is claimed to offer a promising characterization of the fundamental as thatwhich is ungrounded. Detractors of this view argue that there can be fundamental and yet mutuallygrounded entities. Such a possibility undermines the denition of the fundamental as theungrounded. I aim to show, however, that the possibility of fundamental mutually grounded entitiesdoes not force us to renounce the prospects of characterizing fundamentality in terms of ground-ing. To accomplish this aim, I defend a grounding-based view that accommodates fundamentalmutually grounded entities (...) straightforwardly. My denition of fundamentality is similar to, butimportantly different from, one that Karen Bennett discusses. I conclude by resisting two objec-tions raised by Jessica Wilson against the Bennettian framework that also target theproposed view. (shrink)

What grounds facts of ground? Some metaphysicians invoke fundamental grounding laws to answer this question. These are general principles that link grounded facts to their grounds. The main business of this paper is to advance the debate about the metaphysics of grounding laws by exploring the prospects of a plausible yet underexplored minimalist account, one which is structurally analogous to a familiar Humean conception of natural laws. In the positive part of this paper, I articulate such a novel view and (...) argue for its merits. The minimalist account shuns essences and takes laws to be unmysterious elite regularities. Therefore, it is a promising alternative for theorists of ground who spurn the acceptance of essentialism about the grounding laws but think that these are needed in our theorizing. In the negative part, I argue that widely accepted principles of ground, coupled with the tenets of minimalism, jeopardize the fundamentality of the grounding laws. I discuss two immediately available and prima facie appealing strategies to evade this threat. However, I show that both have undesirable theoretical costs. I conclude by casting doubts on whether the benefits of a minimalist account of fundamental grounding laws outweigh such costs. (shrink)

In contemporary metaphysics, the doctrine that the fundamental facts are those which are wholly ungrounded is the received view or something near enough. Against this radical brutalism, several metaphysicians argued in favour of the existence of fundamental facts that are moderately brute or merely partially grounded. However, the arguments for moderately brute facts rely on controversial metaphysical scenarios. This paper aims to counteract the tendency in favour of radical brutalism on scientific grounds. It does so by showing that naturalistic metaphysicians (...) can appeal to plausible considerations from physical theory to establish the existence of moderately brute facts. But should the naturalistic metaphysician embrace moderate brutalism, namely the view that the fundamental facts are those which are merely partially ungrounded? Here I argue for a negative answer, recommending a more inclusive pluralism about the kinds of brute facts we can expect to find in nature. (shrink)

A respectable assessment of priority-based ontic structuralism demands an elucidation of its metaphysical backbone. Here we focus on two theses that stand in need of clarification: the Fundamentality Thesis states that structures are fundamental, and the Priority Thesis states that these structures are prior to putative fundamental objects, if these exist. Candidate notions to illuminate and such as supervenience and ontological dependence failed at this task. Our purpose is to show that grounding is the best competitor to articulate and, and (...) regiment such theses in a desirable unified way. Our strategy is two-fold. First, we make the case that grounding does better than ontological dependence and supervenience. Second, we show that the distinction between partial and full grounds permits us to respond to an objection raised by Kerry McKenzie against the proposal of interpreting priority-based Ontic Structuralism in the idiom of metaphysical determination. Our conclusion is that priority ontic structuralists have compelling reasons for adopting a grounding-based approach. (shrink)

Strong emergentists about mental properties of conscious experience typically hold that these are ontologically “over and above” and distinct in kind as compared to physical properties. Powers-based account of strong emergence offer a promising framework for elucidating the ontological “over and above”-ness of strongly emergent properties. However, they do not automatically ensure the desired non-physicality. In this paper, I argue that a conception of properties as powerful qualities has in-built resources for capturing both the ontological “over and above”-ness and the (...) kind distinctness in a unified way. I begin by illustrating powers-based accounts of strong emergence. Then I defend the superiority of a powerful qualities-based account of strong emergence over two standard approaches recovering the distinctness in kind of strongly emergent mental properties: the via negativa strategy, and the anti-materialist strategy. I conclude that a conception of powerful qualities is a surprising yet natural ally for the proponent of strongly emergent mental properties. (shrink)

Dispositionalism holds that at least some fundamental physical properties are ungrounded dispositional ones. Unfortunately, the very scientific practice that dispositionalists invoke to support their view undermines the dispositional thesis: putative fundamental properties such as mass, charge, and spin appear to be grounded in symmetry structures. Can the dispositionalist hold that fundamental symmetry structures are dispositional? Livanios (2019) defends a negative answer: symmetry structures do not satisfy the truthmaking principle of dispositionality. By contrast, I offer a positive answer. Here I argue (...) that if dispositionalists adopt an identity-based criterion of dispositionality, they can endorse what I shall call moderate dispositional structuralism: the view that the identity of fundamental symmetry structures is partially but not exhaustively fixed by their dispositional character. The purpose of this paper is to articulate moderate dispositional structuralism and its merits. To defend the plausibility of this view, I compare it with its radical counterpart: the view that the identity of symmetry structures is fully or wholly fixed by their dispositionality. -/- . (shrink)

Theorists of grounding believe that this notion has an intimate connection with metaphysical explanation. However, they struggle to harmonize the objective mind-independent features of grounding and the context-sensitive aspects of metaphysical explanation. As a reconciliatory approach, I offer a framework of metaphysical explanation that draws from perspectival realist views in the philosophy of science. According to the proposed view, our understanding of grounding claims is inescapably situated in agent-dependent perspectives that aim to aptly latch onto a grounding structure out there. (...) To defend its merits, I discuss how this grounding perspectivalism offers an insightful analysis of disagreements concerning the priority and asymmetry of what grounds what. Exploring some of the deeper implications of the proposed framework, I conclude by stirring controversy: contrary to a popular view, grounding perspectivalism implies that metaphysical explanation should not be regarded as a guide to grounding. -/- . (shrink)

Some facts ground by generating: they ground by bringing about other facts or grounding connections among them. Intuitively, other facts play a similar role to background conditions in the causal case: they ground by enabling the obtaining of grounded facts or generative connections among them. As we may ask whether causal background conditions are irreducible to causes, we may wonder whether enablers are irreducible to generators. Some metaphysicians defend a genuine metaphysical distinction between generators and enablers. Yet considerations from ideological (...) parsimony and unity should prompt us to defend a unified account of ground. Here, I identify and discuss some characteristics extracted from the literature that are said to be possessed by enablers only. Contrary to this claim, I argue that generators can possess the same features. I conclude that such features should not be regarded as a guide to the irreducibility of enabling to generation. (shrink)

Draws from Latina feminism, existential phenomenology, and race theory to explore the concept of selfhood. This original study intertwining Latina feminism, existential phenomenology, and race theory offers a new philosophical approach to understanding selfhood and identity. Focusing on writings by Gloría Anzaldúa, María Lugones, and Linda Martín Alcoff, Mariana Ortega articulates a phenomenology that introduces a conception of selfhood as both multiple and singular. Her Latina feminist phenomenological approach can account for identities belonging simultaneously to different worlds, including immigrants, (...) exiles, and inhabitants of borderlands. Ortega’s project forges new directions not only in Latina feminist thinking on such issues as borders, mestizaje, marginality, resistance, and identity politics, but also connects this analysis to the existential phenomenology of Martin Heidegger and to such concepts as being-in-the-world, authenticity, and intersubjectivity. The pairing of the personal and the political in Ortega’s work is illustrative of the primacy of lived experience in the development of theoretical understandings of who we are. In addition to bringing to light central metaphysical issues regarding the temporality and continuity of the self, Ortega models a practice of philosophy that draws from work in other disciplines and that recognizes the important contributions of Latina feminists and other theorists of color to philosophical pursuits. Mariana Ortega is Professor of Philosophy at John Carroll University and coeditor (with Linda Martín Alcoff) of Constructing the Nation: A Race and Nationalism Reader, also published by SUNY Press. (shrink)

Dispositional essentialism is the view that all or many fundamental properties are essentially dispositional, orpowers. The literature on the dispositional essence of powers is abundant. In contrast, the question of how to understand the fundamentality of fundamental powers has received scarce interest. Therefore, the fundamentality of powers stands in need of clarification. There are four main conceptions of the fundamental, namely as that which is (i)metaphysically independent; or (ii)belonging to a minimally complete basis; or (iii)perfectly natural; or (iv)metaphysically primitive. Here, (...) I present and discuss each of these approaches from the viewpoint of dispositional essentialism. I show that (i) is incompatible with the metaphysics of powers and (ii)–(iv) have more drawbacks than merits. Therefore, my conclusion is that the dispositional essentialist should seek an alternative. Although I offer no positive account, I pave the way to more fruitful views by identifying the shortcoming of these unpromising options. (shrink)

Este trabajo titulado " El Deber de Adoptar y los Derechos de la niñez en Chile" será incluido en el Volumen 24. Número 86(2024) de Revista Iberoamericana en la sección Foro de Debate denominada “Infancias Latinoamericanas: desafíos para la garantía de derechos en la región".

Joaquim Braga deals with the role of sound in multimodal environments and multimodal surfaces. He argues that imagination not only bridges sensory dimensions that are absent from perception but also is central to “the relationship of presence,” that is, the connection between presently perceived sensory input. This involves assessing both the individuating dimension and the relational disposition of sound, which allows sound—through the activation of imagination—to develop sensory relations. Central to his discussion of the function and contribution of sound (...) in different media is the process of “sonic individuation”—a process of individuation of different modalities—that is presented as a precondition for the creation of relations between these modalities. (shrink)

There is no consensus on the most adequate conception of the fundamental properties of our world. The pure powers view and the identity theory of powerful qualities claim to be promising alternatives to categoricalism, the view that all fundamental properties essentially contribute to the qualitative make-up of things that have them. The pure powers view holds that fundamental properties essentially empower things that have them with a distinctive causal profile. On the identity theory, fundamental properties are dispositional as well as (...) qualitative, or powerful qualities. Despite the manifest difference, Taylor (2018) argues that pure powers and powerful qualities collapse into the same ontology. If this collapse objection were sound, the debate between the pure powers view and the identity theory of powerful qualities would be illusory: these views could claim the same advantages and would suffer the same problems. Here I defend an ontologically robust distinction between pure powers and powerful qualities. To accomplish this aim, I show that the collapse between pure powers and powerful qualities can be resisted. I conclude by drawing some positive implications of this result. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Jc Beall and A. J. Cotnoir proposed a bi-modal solution to the fundamental problem of Christology - the problem of reconciling the apparent contradiction implied by Christ’s divine and human natures. According to their solution, the contradiction could be resolved if one takes Christ’s dual nature as implying two different theological modal notions: one ranging over divine possibilities and the other over human possibilities. As a riposte, I argue that as novel and ingenious as Beall and (...) Cotnoir’s solution may be, it still fails to account for the very crux of the fundamental problem, viz., the true proposition about Christ being God-incarnate. (shrink)

The central thesis of this paper is that in digital media the operations and representations of the human body reveal close somatic and aesthetic links with each other, the latter often working as forms of mitigation of the effects of the former. I will argue, therefore, that, in the digital domain, the modes and contents of representation should not be understood without the embodied relations inherent to the use of devices. For this to be feasible, it is essential to formulate (...) a new conception of the materiality of digital interfaces. Instead of being conceived according to traditional epistemological models—entirely detached from the agent’s performance—such materiality will be thought of in close connection with the nature of embodied relations and the interfaces’ technological structures and functions. (shrink)

Metaphysical orthodoxy holds that a privileged minority of properties carve reality at its joints. These are the so-called fundamental properties. This thesis concerns the contemporary philosophical debate about the nature of fundamental properties. In particular, it aims to answer two questions: What is the most adequate conception of fundamental properties? What is the “big picture” world-view that emerges by adopting such a conception? I argue that a satisfactory answer to both questions requires us to embrace a novel conception of powerful (...) qualities, according to which properties are at once dispositional and qualitative. By adopting the proposed conception of powerful qualities, an original theory of fundamental properties comes to light. I call it Dual-Aspect Account. In this thesis, I defend the Dual-Aspect Account and its superiority with respect to rival views of fundamental properties. I illustrate this claim by examining Dispositionalism, the view defended among others by Alexander Bird and Stephen Mumford, Categoricalism, which has been advocated notably by David Lewis and David Armstrong, and the Identity Theory of powerful qualities, primarily championed by C. B. Martin and John Heil. The latter is the standard conception of powerful qualities. However, in the literature, the Identity Theory faces the charge of contradiction. A preliminary task is therefore to show that a conception of powerful qualities is coherent. To accomplish this aim, I introduce the notion of an aspect of a property. On this interpretation, powerful qualities can be thought of as having dispositional and qualitative aspects. I show that such a conception allows us to disambiguate the claim that a property’s dispositionality is identical with its qualitativity, and evade the charge of contradiction. Aspects bring us other theoretical benefits. I illustrate this claim by showing how the Dual-Aspect Account offers us a promising theory of resemblance. I then compare its merits with David Armstrong’s theory of partial identity. The conclusion of this thesis is that the Dual-Aspect Account is better suited to capturing the world as we find it in everyday life and scientific investigation as compared to the theoretical positions examined. (shrink)

In the fields of linguistics and psychology the didactic implementation of new knowledge relative to argumentative discourse and its acquisition has led us to develop a didactic sequence focused on the teaching of argumentation in 11–12 year old pupils. This sequence was experimented in six schools in order to assess the effect of these new educational methods on the capacities of pupils to treat the dialogic dimensions of argumentation in the writing of monologues. An analysis of the productions of the (...) puils who had been submitted to the didactic sequence, compared with those of a control group, showed a significant improvement in the capacities of the first group. These improvements concerned aspects such as backing up arguments, acknowledging the addressee, negotiating with an eventual contradictor and using of a certain number of units and linguistic expressions t specific to argumentative texts (expressions of responsability taking, textual organisers of cause and conclusion, modalisations of probability and of certitude, concessions and polite expressions). (shrink)

This book provides new theoretical approaches to the subject of virtuality. All chapters reflect the importance of extending the analysis of the concept of “the virtual” to areas of knowledge that, until today, have not been fully included in its philosophical foundations. The respective chapters share new insights on art, media, psychic systems and technology, while also presenting new ways of articulating the concept of the virtual with regard to the main premises of Western thought. Given its thematic scope, this (...) book is intended not only for a philosophical audience, but also for all scientists who have turned to the humanities in search of answers to their questions. (shrink)

The notion of fundamentality is supposed to play an important role in philosophical inquiry and scientific theorising. Yet there is no consensus on how to formulate it in precise terms. According to a promising view, fundamentality is a form of ontological independence. This view has the merit of capturing a natural connection between fundamentality and ontological dependence. However, it has been recently argued that it is possible that there are fundamental and yet ontologically dependent entities; therefore, we should not characterise (...) the fundamental in terms of ontological independence. My aim is to show that such a possibility does not threaten a conception of fundamentality as a form of ontological independence. I illustrate this claim by providing a definition of equifundamentality and showing that fundamental and yet ontologically dependent entities can be treated as equifundamental. (shrink)

As much as it is rooted in empirical facts, the concept of truth in natural sciences and technology has core dimensions marked by the sphere of the possible. As can be inferred from Cassirer’s symbol theory, this is, in both cultural forms, a structuring mode of their symbolic constitution and differentiation. But when the coupling of the two increases (as currently happens with the new pictorial forms of scientific prediction), it is necessary to know the major repercussions imposed on the (...) way of conceiving phenomena—among these, mainly those that concern the formation of our idea of nature. In addition to this theoretical imperative, it will be the purpose of this paper to show how Cassirer’s thought helps us to recognize and reconstruct the relationships between experimental scientific knowledge and technological mediation. Keeping this in mind, a narrow articulation of truth’s functional profile with the idea of the future that permeates both science (especially natural sciences) and technology will be conceived to see how the two symbolic forms reveal the prospective complexion of human thought and human action. (shrink)

This paper offers a contribution to debates around integrative aspects of systems biology and engages with issues related to the circumstances under which physicists look at biological problems. We use oral history as one of the methodological tools to gather the empirical material, conducting interviews with physicists working in systems biology. The interviews were conducted at several institutions in Brazil, Germany, Israel and the U.S. Biological research has been increasingly dependent on computational methods, high-throughput technologies, and multidisciplinary skills. Quantitative scientists (...) are joining biological departments and collaborations between physicists and biologists are particularly vigorous. This state of affairs raises a number of questions, such as: What are the circumstances under which physicists approach biological problems in systems biology? What kind of interdisciplinary challenges must be tackled? The paper suggests that, concerning physicists’ move to work on biological systems, there are common reasons to move, the transition must be understood in terms of degrees, physicists have a rationale for simplifying systems, and distinct conceptions of model and modeling strategies are recurrent. We identified problems regarding linguistic clarity and integration of epistemological aims. We conclude that cultural unconformities within the systems biology community have important consequences to the flow of scientific knowledge. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to analyze the notion of “loving, knowing ignorance,” a type of “arrogant perception” that produces ignorance about women of color and their work at the same time that it proclaims to have both knowledge about and loving perception toward them. The first part discusses Marilyn Frye's accounts of “arrogant” as well as of “loving” perception and presents an explanation of “loving, knowing ignorance.” The second part discusses the work of Audre Lorde, Elizabeth Spelman, and (...) María Lugones in their attempts to deal with the issue of arrogant perception within feminism, and examines how Lugones's notion of “‘world’-traveling” may help us deal with “loving, knowing ignorance.” Ultimately, the author suggests that we need to become aware of instances of “loving, knowing ignorance,” especially if we are to stay true to Third Wave feminism's commitment to diversity. (shrink)

This paper explores the role of a media art gallery within a university setting. Specifically, it examines how mahaus.gallery can contribute to the intellectual and cultural life of the university community. The paper discusses the ways in which a media art gallery can promote interdisciplinary learning and research, foster creative collaborations, and engage with the wider community beyond the university campus. Therefore, through a quantitative approach, we analyzed the role of a media arts gallery in a higher education institution in (...) stimulating entrepreneurship among communication students. The results highlight the importance of interdisciplinary collaboration and institutional support in the development of entrepreneurial skills and indicate that mahaus.gallery is an essential component of the university as it provides a space for innovation, experimentation and critical reflection on the intersection of art and technology. (shrink)

Maria Manuela Saraiva was one of the rare authors that, in the Portuguese philosophical panorama, was devoted to the study of Husserl, namely in what she concemed the statute of the imagination versus aesthetic conscience or artistic universe. Starting with the analysis of their texts on Husserl and Ingarden, we will end considering the eventual aesthetic innovations in Husserl’s work, that is to say from the Logical Investigations to the Formal and Transcendental Logic, going trough the phases imposed between the (...) first and the second volumes of the Ideas. Surpassing the ambiguity of the husserlian language, and given the absence of an aesthetic thought of the master of Göttingen, we will see now the work of art can break out, pure, in itself, beyond the primacy of the perception and by the modification of neutrality. (shrink)

In a first approach, “caring” can be understood as a way of articulating time in full agreement with the need of others. Therefore, and thanks to care, we profit with the access to a peculiar consciousness of time which transcends the practical time of caring and simultaneously fosters and frames our own perception of time itself. Nevertheless, we know that in several care institutions there is a kind of “economic time” which is necessary both to the meeting with the most (...) urgent needs as to fill the scarcity of the available resources. The time of institutionalized care is, above all, measured by the spatial conditions and possibilities as well as by the individuals who daily dwell and struggle in between such factors. The institutionalization of care practices tends to arouse an apparent primacy of space over time. Hospitals, nursing homes, day-care centers for children, recovery centers, among others, are now more likely than ever to fill the lack of time of individuals. Therefore, space is also a material reaction both to the lack of time and to the consciousness of time, especially boosted by those who abandon their loved ones. Based on these multiple articulations of time and space, I will try to show how the relational nature of care is transformed and gives rise to new ways of conceiving the idea of caring. (shrink)

[...] Eu não sou "educador". Basta-me ser um dentre os demais seres do universo. Ou a ventura de ter procurado ser na vida um pedagogo. Nos últimos tempos tenho pensado muito nisto. Acho mesmo que a partir do final da década de 60 nós permitimos a despedagogização do ensino neste país de nome Brasil. Que é verde. amarelo, azul e branco! É mesmo. E pronto. Nestas duas décadas mataram ou permitimos que matassem a disciplina e a seriedade e o prazer (...) na Escola. E, aí, vale a questão: "escola para quê?" [...] Palavras-chave: Educador; Pedagogo; Escola; Brasil; Competência pedagógica. (shrink)

La grille phénoménologique ordinairement, et la phénoménologie husserlienne en particulier, sont les outillages conceptuels que d’un mode général peuvent éclairer la magnifique prose bachelardienne, nommément sa pensée esthétique sur l’ imagination des matières, sur la rêverie matérielle de la tétralogie des élements naturels. De même que le phénomène n’est pas au-delà de son apparaître, aussi l’ image matérielle, elle même, s’épuise dans cet acte d’une évidence aprioristique, ce qui lui confère le sens propre de l’image, à savoir, l’image par l’ (...) image. L’imagination se constitue donc en tant qu’une unité de présentafication / neutralisation au dedans de la consciense esthétique. Nous pouvons distinguer la fonction thématique de l’imagination de la fonction positionelle de l’imagination et les rapporter au lieu originel d’une irrealité, d’un fictum. (shrink)

Summary We intended to contribute with an innovation for the study of the applied phenomenology to the field of the imaginary. It is a group of ideas that will allow to elaborate a phenomenological reading of Gaston Bachelard’s aesthetic work. In first place we will approach the husserlian notion of neutrality modification as form of opening road to the interpretation of the bachelardian imagination of the matters. Continuously we will present some theories that demonstrate the possibility of a new phenomenology, (...) the dynamic phenomenology. We will end with a type of introduction to another phenomenological attitude based on the topoanalysis and in the awake ego of the active imagination. (shrink)

The use of digital tracking technologies is a widespread phenomenon. Millions of people around the world now track, document, and analyse their physical activities, vital functions, and daily habits through wearable devices, apps, and platforms. The aim is to assess and improve health, productivity, and wellbeing. The current Covid-19 pandemic has accelerated the uptake of tracking technologies. At the heart of this trend lies the quantification of the body, deemed as a key element in medical practice and personal self-care. While (...) often couched in positive promotional terms that highlight its value to users' mental, emotional, and physical health, it is also raising a host of issues and concerns that are at once ontological, ethical, political, social, legal, economic, and aesthetic. The Quantification of Bodies in Health aims to deepen understanding of this growing phenomenon and of the role of self-tracking practices in everyday life. It brings together established and emerging authors working at the intersection of philosophy, sociology, history, psychology, and digital culture, while bridging between philosophical and empirical approaches. A timely topic of extreme relevance and significance, The Quantification of Bodies in Health constitutes a useful and unique companion for anyone interested in the study of body quantification and self-tracking practices. (shrink)

Theologian-philosopher, Júlio Moreira Fragata, has defended in 1954 his graduation (degree) as a doctor at the Gregorian University, his thesis entitled The Phenomenology of Husserl as foundation of the Philosophy. Among this author’s varied works, this one is the work which we had set out, given its importance for the phenomenology in Portugal. Besides, our study is aimed to be a pedagogical support and for the least exercised in these subjects, it is a light introduction to the phenomenological thought. Divided (...) in two parts: > and «Some considerations on the fragatian conception ofEdmund Husserl’s phenomenology>>, this text still intends to explain that the true foundation of the philosophy, for the author, is the phenomenology, this means, the direct observation of that which shows itselfto the conscience through the evidence of the things, in spite of his theological concerns. (shrink)

Centrada na reflexão sobre as diversas formas culturais que geram o liame simbólico entre homem e mundo, a filosofia cassireriana está, simultaneamente, comprometida com uma “antropologia da individuação”, através da qual é possível vislumbrar as possibilidades de formação da consciência humana face ao universo mediado pelo símbolo. Tal como Cassirer inúmeras vezes reitera, é no interior desse universo que devem ser procurados os principais nexos individuantes subjacentes à energia criadora do espírito. Daí que, no próprio conceito de cultura cassireriano, as (...) formas simbólicas – mito, religião, ciência, arte, linguagem, técnica – assumam, ab initio, o estatuto de realizações progressivas da auto-libertação do ser humano. Ao contrário da tese da Tragödie der Kultur, de Georg Simmel, as formas simbólicas e os seus artefactos materiais não encerram o sujeito num cosmo auto-suficiente, absoluto e definitivo, cuja natureza objectiva tende a pôr em causa a formação da sua vida subjectiva. Para Cassirer, inversamente, os processos de simbolização são inscrições do sentido em devir, isto é, tanto estruturam a apreensão da realidade como pressupõem a sua contínua transformação. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: SATS Jahrgang: 17 Heft: 2 Seiten: 185-196.